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Abstract
This paper studies moral hazard in a sickness-insurance fund that provided the model for social-
insurance schemes around the world.  The German Knappschaften were formed in the medieval period
to provide sickness, accident, and death benefits for miners.  By the mid-nineteenth century,
participation in the Knappschaft was compulsory for workers in mines and related occupations, and the
range and generosity of benefits had expanded considerably.  Each  Knappschaft was locally controlled
and self-funded, and their admirers saw in them the ability to use local knowledge and good incentives
to deliver benefits at low costs.  The Knappschaft underlies Bismarck’s sickness and accident insurance
legislation (1883 and 1884), which in turn forms the basis of the German social-insurance system today
and, indirectly, many social-insurance systems around the world.  This paper focuses on a problem
central to any insurance system, and one that plagued the Knappschaften as they grew larger in the later
nineteenth century: the problem of moral hazard.  Replacement pay for sick miners made it attractive, on
the margin, for miners to invent or exaggerate conditions that made it impossible for them to work. 
Here we outline the moral hazard problem the Knappschaften faced as well as the internal mechanisms
they devised to control it.  We then use econometric models to demonstrate that those mechanisms were
at best imperfect.
JEL codes: N33, N43, H55, H53, I18
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Most wealthy countries today face serious problems related to the way they insure their 
populations against the financial consequences of illness, accident, and old age. A central issue in the 
design of these social insurance schemes dogged them in the nineteenth century and remains critical 
today: how to target benefits to the program’s intended beneficiaries. Many of the conditions or events 
against which policy intends to insure individuals are difficult or costly for others to observe. Without 
proper controls, generous benefits will both increase the welfare of the targeted population, as intended, 
and encourage others to claim they belong to the targeted population, wasting resources and perhaps 
reducing political support for the program. This paper focuses on a particular type of moral hazard that 
became a serious issue for sickness funds in the late nineteenth century: the role of replacement pay for 
sick workers in elevating absenteeism. Moral hazard for health insurance is ordinarily not a serious issue; 
few people experience direct utility from medical treatment for imagined illness. But many observers 
thought that replacement pay for some workers gave them an incentive to feign or exaggerate maladies.
1
Moral hazard of this form became an important question in the design and build-up sickness and 
accident insurance system created in Germany in the late nineteenth century. This paper focuses on the 
Knappschaften (or KV), the organizations through which German miners, insure themselves against 
accident, illness, and old-age.
 
2
                                                           
1 A contemporary literature on another form of ex ante moral hazard in medical insurance notes that insurance may 
make individuals less likely to care for their health or safety. For a recent contribution see Dave and Kaestner 
(2009). 
 The Knappschaften predated Bismarck’s famous social-insurance system 
and in many ways were the model his system. The Knappschaften’s problems implied serious difficulties 
in extending the system to other classes of workers; miners had long identified themselves as a privileged 
group with their own ideas of honor and self-help, and if moral hazard undermined mutual insurance in 
this industry then the entire idea was problematic. Germany’s social-insurance system operating today is 
based, indirectly, on the model pioneered by the Knappschaften. These organizations still exist, and 
2 Knappschaft is singular, Knappschaften, plural. The German literature usually refers to these institutions as 
Knappschaftsverein, or “Knappschaft organization” (KV).  We refer to the Knappschaft’s members as “miners” as 
short-hand. The Knappschaften had two distinct roles: they provided sickness and accident insurance as well as 
disability insurance for cases where the workers were no long able to work, and benefits to survivors. This paper 
focuses on the sickness and accident insurance alone. The disability component is the subject of a future paper. For 
simplicity we refer throughout to “sickness” when we mean “sickness and accidents.” 5 
 
although the industries in which they work have been in decline, the Knappschaften themselves are 
active. The Knappschaften had two distinctive features. First, the workers and firms in covered industries 
fund and run the organization themselves. Although they operate within constraints set down by the 
government, the Knappschaften tell us much about member preferences. Second, membership in the 
relevant Knappschaft was compulsory for anyone who worked in the covered industries. Adverse 
selection plagued  contemporary, voluntary self-insurance schemes. The Knappschaften allow us to study 
health insurance in a context where adverse selection is not possible.
3
We focus here on a period of dramatic change, from the 1850s until World War I. For the 
Knappschaften, two questions dominated in this period.  The first was how to transform often small, 
informal organizations into institutions that could meet the growing needs of their members, without 
destroying the sense of solidarity that allowed the Knappschaften to provide a guaranteed safety net 
without being overwhelmed by moral hazard problems. Moral hazard was a serious issue in the eyes of 
contemporary observers; Schlockow (1881, p. 126) is just one observer who viewed moral hazard as a 
serious threat to the entire mutual-insurance approach. Simulation (feigning illness) and Verschleppung 
(pretending to be ill after cured) supposedly plagued nearly all Knappschaften.  The mean number of 
reported sick days per Knappschaft per year rose from 6.2 in 1867 to 9.7 in 1907, an average annual rate 
of increase of about one per cent per year.  
 
This paper uses the official reports of the KV to test for the existence and extent of moral hazard. 
Contemporaries stressed an important trade-off that we study below. Larger Knappschaften were arguably 
better, ceteris paribus, than small. A larger institution could spread administrative overheads over more 
workers; could build and operate its own hospitals, with staff and facilities specialized for the problems 
facing their members; and a larger institution could better absorb the risk of unusual financial demands 
                                                           
3 Since all workers must join their Knappschaft, the only adverse selection possible would be that associated with 
choice of occupation. Clearly the Knappschaft made mining and the other dangerous occupations more attractive 
than they would have been in the absence of the Knappschaft. It is theoretically possible, as well, that men would 
decide to become miners because for some reason they thought themselves more likely to become ill. We have never 
seen a suggestion to this effect in the literature. It seems unlikely; before a worker could become a full member of 
the Knappschaft, a doctor had to certify that the worker was healthy (provide a Gesundheitsattest). 6 
 
posed by a serious accident or outbreak of illness. Yet many claimed that the problem of moral hazard 
was worse in the larger Knappschaften. In a larger institution, workers were less likely to know each other 
personally and more likely to feel that in abusing the fund they are abusing an institution, rather than their 
friends’ pocketbooks. A larger Knappschaft’s members were typically also more geographically 
separated, because its mines and other works were spread out over a larger area. Such workers might be 
better able (or feel more emboldened) to make false reports to the organization. 
 
1.  An overview of the Knappschaften 
The first Knappschaften date to the Middle Ages. Their role was clarified and strengthened by the 
Joachimsthaler Bergordnung (mining law) of 1584. The early Knappschaften focused on religious 
observance, and on representing the miner’s interests before territorial lords. Their social-welfare 
functions developed in stages. Miners first collected voluntary contributions, following an accident, to 
support the injured miner or his widow and children. Later miners collected regular but still voluntary 
contributions to create a fund to pay for the consequences of accidents. The Knappschaft eventually 
adopted regular, obligatory contributions to this fund (the so-called “Büchsenpfennig”).  But there was 
still no legal right to support from the fund; the KV remained a charitable organization rather than  an 
insurance institution. In the final step the law regulated both the mandatory contributions and the miner’s 
rights to compensation from the institution’s fund. This change marked the Knappschaft’s transformation 
into institution for insurance in the modern sense. The Knappschaften’s history reflects changes in the 
organization and control of mining itself. An important step came in the 1760s, when Frederick the 
Great’s regime introduced the control principle (“Direktionsprinzip”) for his Prussian territories. Under 
this system, both the mines and the Knappschaften were run by state employees.  Mine owners had only 
an advisory role, and their rights were restricted to selling the mines’ output.
4
                                                           
4 This principle was introduced through many laws and edicts, reflecting the territorial fragmentation of Frederick’s 
realm. The most important of which were the „revidierte cleve-märkische Bergordnung für das Herzogtum Cleve, 
Fürstentum Moers und für die Grafschaft Marck vom 29. April 1766;“ the „revidierte schlesische Bergordnung vom 
5. Juni 1769;“ the „revidierte Magdeburg-Halberstädtische Bergordnung vom 7. Dezember 1772;“  the „General-
 Prussia dramatically 7 
 
changed its mining law and administration in the 1850s. Owners obtained full control over their mines, 
along with the right to set wages, to hire and fire workers, etc.
5 Each Knappschaft now decided on 
contributions as well as benefits for members. In 1854 the method for computing workers’ contributions 
was changed. A KV either required each member to pay a flat percentage of his wages, or could establish 
a set of classes, each with a fixed annual contribution. The new regulations required that sick pay be paid 
as a fixed amount and for a total of eight weeks only. Mine owners had to contribute an amount equal to 
at least half of the members’ contributions (this condition was restated as §175 of the 1865 Act). Changes 
to liability law in 1871 gave owners compensation for their contributions to the Knappschaften; in case of 
liability for the injury or death of their workers, the KV’s entire contribution to the worker or his heirs 
were subtracted from the firm’s portion of any damages.
6
  The 1865 Allgemeine Berggesetz (general mining law) introduced an option intended to improve 
the Knappschaft’s ability to control costs. A Knappschaft could establish multiple funds for sickness and 
accident insurance while keeping a common pension fund for the membership as a whole. This new 
wrinkle reflected concern over Simulation. A pension fund needs a wide area to diversify risks, the 
argument went, but a sickness fund benefits relatively more from the ability to control costs. The new rule 
reflected serious moral-hazard problems with Simulation in the Ruhr area especially: “This rule was the 
consequence of frequent malingering, which in the Ruhr area led to a great increase in costs.” (Witz 
(1910, p.195).  No Knappschaft took advantage of the new rules. Rather, they stopped giving sick pay for 
Sundays, and introduced a waiting period (Karenzzeit) of three days before a worker became eligible for 
sick pay.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Privilegium für die Bergleute im Herzogtum Cleve, Fürstentum Moers und Grafschaft Marck vom 16. Mai 1767; 
and the „Instruction zur Einrichtung und Führung der Knappschafts-Casse für die Bergwerke im Herzogtum Cleve, 
Fürstentum Moers und Grafschaft Marck vom 16. Mai 1767.“ 
5 The three laws were: Gesetz vom 12. Mai 1851 betr. die Verhältnisse der Miteigentümer eines Bergwerks. Gesetz 
vom 10. April 1854 betreffend die Vereinigung der Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenarbeiter in Knappschaften. 
Allgemeines Berggesetz für die preußischen Staaten vom 24. Juni 1865. 
6 This only applied if the firm paid at least one-third of the Knappschaft’s costs. Firms were required to contribute at 
least one-third but could and did contribute more. Haftpflichtgesetz betreffend der Verbindlichkeit zum 
Schadensersatze für die bei dem Betriebe von Eisenbahnen, Bergwerken, Fabriken, Steinbrüchen und Gräbereien 
herbeigeführten Tödtungen und Körperverletzungen vom 7. Juni 1871, §4. 8 
 
  The Knappschaften faced further changes when Bismarck’s social insurance scheme included 
them in the general German insurance system. Conventional wisdom holds that Bismarck’s social-
insurance policies marked a revolution in the role of the European state in providing social welfare (for an 
overview, see Hentschel (1983)). Historians are less sure, stressing the degree to which Bismarck simply 
extended the key characteristics of the Knappschaft to ever-larger numbers of German workers (see, for 
example, Tampke (1982)). But the Reich policy reduced the autonomy the KV had enjoyed since the 
1850s, and once the Reich scheme was introduced, the KV comprised a small part of a very large system. 
Figure 1 reports their share of all workers insured under Bismarck’s social-insurance funds. The changes 
in the KV’s relative share reflects the growth of the larger system, which kept adding to the groups of 
workers that were covered, as well as differential growth rates for workers in mining and other covered 
areas. From the first of January 1887, they were required to meet the standards of all other German 
sickness insurance funds (Betriebskrankenkassen). The new rules required many KV to increase both 
daily sick pay and the length of time workers could claim this benefit. In 1903 the Reich further increased 
the minimum benefits paid by institutions such as the Knappschaften, and, as of the first of January 1905, 
the duration for sick pay increased to twenty-six weeks, coupled with increased sick pay per week.
7
Our discussion focuses on Prussia and Bavaria, which between them accounted for the vast majority 
of Knappschaften and members. Prussian legislation was also influential in the rest of Germany.  Bavaria, 
for example, adopted the 1865 Prussian law almost without changes.
  
8
 
 The important exception to 
Prussian influence was Saxony, which went its own way. Unfortunately, the information we use in our 
econometric analysis is not available for Saxony.  
Internal management of the Knappschaft 
                                                           
7 A special Knappschaft law in 1906 required separate accounting for the sickness and accident insurance 
component on the one hand and the pension component on the other. Because the Knappschaft could still apply 
reserves from one fund to the other, we doubt this had any real effect on the matters we study here. 
8 Imbusch (1910, p. 109) claims that the Bavarian organizations were even more fragmented than those in Prussia.   9 
 
  After 1865, the Knappschaften were no longer run by state officials. From the Middle Ages the 
miners had elected a body called the Elders (“Knappschaftsälteste”) who advised the state officials 
running the institution. With the reforms of the 1850s, the roles of the firm and the membership in 
running the Knappschaften became more formal.  Each local organization had a managing board 
(Vorstand) consisting of equal numbers of representatives chosen by the owners and by the Älteste 
(Imbusch (1910, p.25)). Under §167 of the 1865 law, the Älteste selected as worker representatives either 
Knappschaft members or royal or private mining officials (Beamten). These representatives could be 
employed by another mine (Brassert 1888, p.471). Most sources agree that in practice, the firm’s views 
dominated the Vorstand’s decisions. As one historian puts it, “In reality the owners had, during the entire 
history of the Knappschaften, a practical dominance that they knew how to use. Ordinarily the chair of the 
Vorstand was an owner representative, and the owner’s representatives often outclassed the Ältesten 
intellectually…” (Lauf (2006, p. 272)). Imbusch (1910, p.64) argues the same. 
The Knappschaften divided their members into two groups. Ständig members (“established”) had 
greater rights to benefits than did Unständige (unestablished) members. Some sources suggest that 
Unständige members earned high wages, as one would expect.
9 Knappschaften could and did further 
subdivide their members into many more classes. Ständig members included managers as well as miners 
who had successfully completed a probationary period in the mines.The distinction remained, but in the 
nineteenth century the government required the Knappschaften to extend more benefits to the 
Unständige.
10
The most important decisions for any Vorstand were the basic policy matters of how much to 
offer in benefits and how to structure those benefits. As already noted, some of these decisions were 
constrained by Reich rules by the end of our period. The managing committee also had to decide on 
contributions. In practice, Knappschaften set contributions in a given year with an eye to expected costs, 
  
                                                           
9 Fischer (1961, p. 186). Murray and Nilsson (2007) show that in the Austria, which had a system similar to 
Germany, the labor market priced out the value of accident insurance coverage in such a way as to reduce the 
compensating differential for risk in wages.  
10 The official sources call these members Ständig und Unständig. Another term, used by both Köhne (1915) and 
Bülow (1905), is eingeschrieben (registered) and uneingeschrieben. The distinction is the same. 10 
 
but also relied on reserve funds to correct for over- or under-estimates. In the next year they could adjust 
contributions to try to return the reserves to the desired level. 
 
2. The broader implications of the Knappschaften  
The Knappschaften will remind the reader of several different organizations that became prominent, 
and in some cases foundered, in the later nineteenth century. The issues discussed here are also central to 
broader themes in the development of social insurance and health insurance, in part because the German 
model has been so widely imitated. Some broader remarks will help situate what we can learn from the 
empirical results reported below. Perhaps the first institution to compare to the Knappschaft is the British 
Friendly Society.
11
 The Friendly Societies’ voluntary character led to problems that contemporaries and scholars alike 
hold central to their decline. First, because Friendly Societies refused to tie contributions to age, relatively 
few young, healthy people wanted to join. This is not the canonical adverse-selection problem caused by 
inability to separate potential members by their “type;” it was, rather, just that for a given annual 
membership fee and benefit package, only older individuals were willing to join. Riley (1997, pp. 289-
291) notes that Friendly Society rules allowed them to deny membership to people who were probably 
 Like the Knappschaft, the Friendly Society collected contributions from members and 
used those funds to provide benefits to members who became ill or died. The Friendly Societies also 
consisted of self-governing, local organizations (called “courts”), usually amalgamated into national 
organizations such as the Oddfellows or Ancient Order of Foresters. But any further parallel is 
misleading.  Friendly Society membership was strictly voluntary, and while overseen by a Registrar of 
Friendly Societies, the organizations were in essence free of  government control. Riley (1997, p.37) 
stresses that to their members, the Friendly Society was as much about fellowship as financial security. A 
sick member could count on visits from other members, and his widow and orphan knew there would be a 
large turnout at a member’s funeral. Accounts of Knappschaften sometimes stress the same idea, but, 
given the compulsion to join, the sense of solidarity doubtless was different. 
                                                           
11 The Friendly Society also appeared in Ireland and in most of the British Commonwealth. 11 
 
bad risks, but that they rarely did so; “…judging from the way they operated, friendly societies did not 
expect to be able to distinguish good risks from bad risks with much accuracy.” As a consequence, their 
membership grew older, and Friendly Societies found it harder and harder to fund the benefits their 
members expected. Some argue that this actuarial problem was central to their eventual demise.
12
 Knappschaft membership was compulsory, so the KV did not confront the adverse-selection problem 
that eventually undermined the Friendly Societies. But the German funds did face problems caused by 
changing demographics they could not control. If a mine was worked-out and employment contracting, 
the relevant Knappschaft would consist of older workers. We find that the Simulation problem was worse 
in Knappschaften with a contracting workforce. Some of this effect reflects the health problems of older 
workers, but controls for member age-structure suggest this effect is slight. The stronger influence seems 
to have been the knowledge that the firm and its KV were dying, and the desire to take advantage of 
benefits while they were still available.  
 
The Friendly Societies also faced the question of who was sick and whether some illness reflected 
the equivalent of Simulation. The issue was the most frequent subject of discussion at local meetings 
(Riley 1997, p.99). He stresses that “friendly society members did not disagree among themselves about 
their ability, aided by doctors and sick visitors, to distinguish sickness from wellness” (Riley 1997, 
p.104). Friendly Societies adopted methods for controlling false claims that are similar to methods used 
by the KV discussed below. Some appointed a special “sick steward” whose responsibility it was to visit 
those claiming benefits to make sure they were really ill. Later on doctors were charged with a similar 
responsibility. Friendly Societies also forbad those who were claiming sick pay to appear at a pub (Riley 
1997, pp.99-103). 
Another group of institutions that evoke some of the same themes are Germany’s credit 
cooperatives. Once again these institutions faced problems of possible adverse selection at both the 
                                                           
12 Wilkinson (1892) reported in 1892 that British Friendly Societies collectively had unfunded liabilities of more 
than ten million pounds. Gilbert (1965) argues that Friendly-Society opposition to universal old age insurance 
collapsed in the face of their own manifest inability to provide benefits, ushering in the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act. 
Emery (1996)’s analysis of U.S. and Canadian fraternal sickness funds shows, on the other hand, that inappropriate 
pricing was not a serious problem for them. 12 
 
membership-decisions and credit-decision stages. Guinnane (2001) argues that they devised ways to draw 
on the dense ties of information and enforcement, implicit in their local design, to overcome these 
problems. The cooperatives, like Knappschaften, appreciated the possibilities of scale but were concerned 
that a larger organization meant would increase information problems. Some rural cooperatives had 
formal rules that restricted their size and area of operations, for example. The credit cooperatives took 
advantage of both local information and economies of scale by creating specialist regional organizations 
to handle issues best dealt with by a larger organization. This approach resembles the ability to create 
local sickness funds that the Knappschaften rejected. 
 
Models for sickness and accident insurance 
  A larger, comparative literature also bears on the Knappschaften because of the German social-
insurance system’s status as a model, positive or negative, for other countries. The connection is 
especially clear in discussions of the historical origins of the U.S. health insurance system – that is, why 
the U.S. does not have universal health care. Two recent contributions to this vast literature help frame the 
issues. Murray (2007) considers the actual sickness funds in operation in the U.S. in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, as well as the European (really, German) models many U.S. Progressives 
wanted instead. Many U.S. workers were insured by schemes that covered them either through their 
union, or through their firm, or by virtue of their membership in a voluntary sickness fund that might or 
might not have been, formally, a Friendly Society. Murray argues that most workers prized this coverage 
not because of provisions for doctors and related medical-care costs, but because the funds replaced part 
of lost wages when a worker was ill. Doctors and hospitals could not do much for workers (or at least the 
workers thought). Sick pay in the U.S. funds gave rise, not surprisingly, to the same problems and 
arguments as in Germany; employers thought sick pay encouraged absenteeism, but others thought the 
benefits of a healthy and loyal workforce offset any costs associated with malingering. In Murray’s view, 
the Progressive insistence on a German-style system for the U.S. reflected either purely political motives, 
or misapprehensions about what the U.S. already had, coupled with an idealized understanding of what 13 
 
the European systems had achieved. Murray acknowledges that some features of the German-style 
systems (such as compulsory membership) obviate some of the problems facing the U.S. funds at the 
time, but insists, rightly, that any insurance scheme faced information and incentive problems that the 
Progressives were simply ignoring. 
  A second view, most recently articulated by Klein (2003), dismisses the various sickness funds 
operating in the U.S. in the early twentieth century as inadequate or ineffective at best, and tools of 
devious employers at worst. Her disagreement with the kind of argument represented by Murray is based 
on two differences in approach. First, she and others who take this view probably do not appreciate how 
large (and, given that most were voluntary, popular) these U.S. sickness funds were. They did not 
approach anything like universal coverage, but neither did the German-style systems in their early years. 
Second, there is a tendency to judge these funds by a standard different from what workers at the time 
valued. They were not medical-insurance funds; that is not what workers wanted, and to judge them by 
that standard is a curious confusion of modern concerns with historical explanation. 
   
3. The problem of “Simulation” 
Some of the complaints about Simulation had a moralistic, anti-worker tone. The central issue is 
that the Knappschaft was insuring on an unobservable, the worker’s health status. To make clear the 
problem of moral hazard we use the core idea from Guinnane and Streb (2009). Consider as a 
simplification a myopic worker’s one-day problem: whether to work or to report sick. A worker earns a 
wage w from a day of work. Each day he draws a health status z, where z is a uniform random variable 
distributed on the [0,1] interval. For each day he works, the workers receives utility from income u(w) 
and a disutility of work that depends on his health status z, c(z). The utility function has the usual 
properties, while c(z) is increasing in z, so a higher z denotes a worse health status.  
Assume first that a miner who does not work earns nothing, that is, there is no sick benefit. In this 
situation a miner works if u(w)-c(z) > u(0) or u(w) – u(0) >c(z). For a given w, we can define a health 
status z* implicitly such that a worker is indifferent between work and reporting sick, u(w)–u(0)= c(z*). 14 
 
On any given day, workers with health status 1-z* call in sick. Now suppose that a sickness fund 
introduces a program under which workers pay a proportion (1-α)  of their wages into a fund used to pay 
a benefit b to miners who call in sick. Miners will now work if u(αw)-u(b)>c(z). We can define z
b 
implicitly as the health status realization that makes an insured miner indifferent between work and 
claiming benefit, u(αw)-u(b)=c(z
b). Clearly z
b < z*; a fraction of workers equal to z* - z
b 
 would work if 
there is no benefit, but call in sick because the Knappschaft will pay b.
13
Many observers referred to Simulation when increases in sick pay prompted more miners to 
report ill. For example, Bülow (1907, p.64) notes that after the introduction of new rules in the districts of 
Bochum and Essen, the Knappschaften there experienced a strong increase in “Simulation und 
Verschleppung” of diseases. The situation only improved when sick pay was cut by one-third.
 
14
Simulation could mean, as critics claimed, that a perfectly healthy miner would get out of bed one 
morning and decide that he would rather go fishing, or work in his garden, than go into the mines. The 
 What 
observers wanted, apparently, was to be able to increase benefits for workers so that those with z > z* 
would have higher incomes, but without inducing any additional workers to report sick. But this was 
unrealistic. Health status was imperfectly observable; without additional measures, it would be only 
rational for workers with status from z
b to z* to take advantage of the benefits scheme. This is why 
Knappschaften introduced waiting periods and other controls, and why many observers thought it 
important to use social pressure to induce miners to refrain from calling in sick, even when their health 
status was worse than z*.  
                                                           
13 Modern studies of the effect of unemployment insurance and related programs identify the “replacement rate” or 
benefits as a fraction of working pay, as a key control variable. In our terms this is b/αw. We do not observe this 
measure in systematic fashion. Lauf (2006, p.281) reports that the Knappschaft in the Rhein and Ruhr areas paid 
about sixty percent of the daily wage for sick workers. Other accounts sound similar. This sick pay was in addition 
to the costs of medical attention and supplies. 
14 „Es zeigte sich bald nach der Einführung des neuen Reglements, dass die Vermögen der Knappschaftskassen 
keinen merklichen Zuwachs mehr erfuhren, indem die Ausgaben die Einnahmen fast völlig aufzehrten. Dies hatte 
seine Ursache wesentlich darin, … dass die Krankenschichtlöhne zu hoch angesetzt waren, wodurch zu manchen 
Simulationen und Verschleppungen von Krankheiten Anlass gegeben wurde. Eine oberbergamtliche Verfügung betr. 
Verhütung von Simulationen, nach der das Krankengeld erst vom fünften Tage ab und nach erfolgter Konstatierung 
der Arbeitsunfähigkeit durch den Bergarzt verabreicht werden durfte, schuf keine Besserung. Erst als am 31. Juli 
1834 die Krankenlöhne auf 2/3 des früheren Betrages heruntergesetzt wurden, erzielte man wieder günstige 
Kassenabschlüsse, so dass die Vermögen der Kassen sich von Jahr zu Jahr recht erheblich steigerten." 15 
 
greater the replacement rate, the greater the incentive to take a week off at Knappschaft expense. We call 
this behavior Type I Simulation. Note that Type I cannot really exist in our framework; to account for it, 
we would have to assume that some workers have little use for money or a high disutility of work. A 
second problem corresponds to our example. Mining was hard, dangerous work. Miners would come 
home from a day’s work with bruises and muscle strains that required several days’ recuperation. The 
miner could, in fact, work the next day, but had good reason not to want to. The effect of the Knappschaft 
benefit in this less moralistic exposition is to reduce the cost to the miner of time to heal. We will call this 
Type II Simulation although it is clearly not what contemporaries had in mind. Note that Type I 
Simulation implies there was never anything wrong with the miner [z=0], while Type II implies that the 
miner was in fact sick, but not so sick that he would forgo wages if that was the only way to avoid 
working. If all illness were perfectly observable, then Type I Simulation would not exist, and we would 
not call Type II Simulation at all. One could argue that what German observers called Type II malingering 
was actually efficient, because it promoted the restoration of a worker to his full productivity. A third 
behavior is also relevant. Simulation and Verschleppung are both translated in English as “malingering,” 
but the former implies that the condition is invented, and the later implies that the condition was real but 
the sufferer has exaggerated its duration. The idea here is that a worker really was ill for three weeks, but 
reported ill for an additional week because of the moral hazard problem. We will refer to this as Type III 
Simulation.  
The literature makes several suggestions as to why Simulation increased in the later nineteenth 
century. Some authors argue that the 1854 Prussian law, which converted miners from a privileged Stand 
to ordinary proletarians, was the root of the problem. Lauf (2006, p.266) refers to a wave of protest at the 
demotion of the Knappschaft from the institutional symbol of that special status to the more prosaic role 
of insurance provider. We cannot test that claim, as the change proceeds the period for which we have 
useful data. Two other claims are testable. The first is that KV size promoted moral hazard. In a large 
Knappschaft a miner felt less that abusing the system was hurting someone to whom he had real social 16 
 
ties. Observers often noted that miners were in a better position than others to know who was really 
unable to work, and that the risk of ill-will from fellow miners was an effect deterrent. In Guinnane and 
Streb (2009) we note the implications of imposing an additional disutility, in the form of worker 
opprobrium, on those who call in sick when they in fact have a low draw of z. In this case the 
Knappschaft could increase b without increasing the numbers calling in sick; in effect, this extension 
relies on the assumption that fellow miners could overcome the assumed information problem. 
Large Knappschaften could certainly undermine the informal controls that made the organizations 
work. Members in larger Knappschaften could well never see each other. They often worked in widely-
disbursed pits and work would never bring them into contact. Some KV were huge, and some enterprises 
had grown so large that it would be hard to feel any sense of solidarity just within the single enterprise. In 
our data, for example, the median works has 121 Knappschaft members employed.  But one KV had over 
ten thousand workers per enterprise. There were frequent claims about the relationship between KV costs 
and either the Knappschaft’s size (membership) or the area over which it was spread.  A large or spread-
out Knappschaft exacerbated moral hazard by making it more difficult for workers to observe each other. 
In discussing Saxon Knappschaften, Elsholz (1910, p. 36) explicitly argues that in a small organization 
workers will work to control costs, and that if they are spread out in several different mines this is not 
possible “for sickness funds, small and local organizations (Gebilde) are needed, because it is in the 
fund’s interest for workers to have an interest in thwarting Simulation.” Simons (1895, p. 8), Wirtz (1911, 
p.105), make similar arguments, and Lauf (2006, p. 271) notes that the need to reduce the size of the 
insured group was a theme from the 1880s.  
The Reich’s interventions, requiring greater sick pay and longer periods of coverage, also 
contributed to the problem. Higher sick pay would, ceteris paribus, lead to more Simulation of all three 
types, by reducing the cost of time off. The longer benefits period would also encourage Simulation.  The 
Karenzzeit is like an investment for the worker; by extending the benefit period, the government reduced 
the cost of that investment relative to the payback. This effect would increase Type I and II Simulation. A 
longer benefits period would also enable Type III Simulation for mechanical reasons. 17 
 
  A final argument implies that the sick pay was being used as a substitute for unemployment 
insurance. Several commentators noted that Simulation became a more serious problem during downturns 
in the covered industries. Sick pay was set as a fixed daily sum, but the worker’s income depended on 
demand for their product.
15
 
 This implies that the replacement rate varied over the business cycle, 
increasing as economic conditions worsened. In the 1870s, for example, a serious downturn reduced the 
demand for coal and thus the miners’s daily income from work. Bry (1960, Table A-8) reports an index of 
shift earnings for Dortmund miners. This index (1913=100) falls from 77 in 1873 to 39 in 1879. Overall, 
the coefficient of variation for the index in the period 1871-1914 is 27 percent, indicating that miners 
faced large fluctuations in the demand for their labor. This situation led to considerable Simulation, 
according to Menzel (1989, p.102) who quotes an 1894 eyewitness at a later date. “… Simulation 
increases especially in bad times.  When wages fall, that is, when workers worked only part time, then the 
experience is that sicknesses increase and with them the costs for the sickness fund.” Menzel’s eyewitness 
also claimed that firms encouraged Simulation in downturns, tacitly turning the Knappschaft into a form 
of unemployment insurance.
  
Combating the problem 
Knappschaften were aware of the problem and adopted measures to reduce Simulation. Some 
tactics took for granted that additional information on the health status of the miners would be too 
difficult to acquire, and instead tried to create the desire separating equilibrium by reducing the 
attractiveness of being ill. Some KV required that those receiving medical treatment and sick pay remain 
in hospital (Lazarettezwang). Miners detested this policy, although we cannot say whether it was because 
it made recuperation more unpleasant or malingering harder. According to Lauf (2006, p.284), the rules 
of the Upper Silesia association required all illness to be treated in hospital.
16
                                                           
15 Miners were paid a team piece rate. The rate was re-negotiated at regular intervals, implying that the rate would 
track current output prices. See Banken (2000, pp.100ff). 
 The results of the policy 
16 We have not been able to determine when this rule was introduced.  Lauf (2004, p.153) reports that in 1857 this 
Knappschaft already had ten hospitals. According to Köhne (1915, p. 38), „Besonders intensive Krankenhauspflege 18 
 
were impressive: for the period 1901-1908, this Knappschaft experienced 6.4 sick days per member, 
compared to 10.8 for other Prussian Knappschaften and 7.6 for Germany as a whole. Köhne (1915, p.38) 
notes a similar policy in a different context, with the same results. Unfortunately, we cannot test the 
implications of the hospitalization policy directly. 
The waiting period to receive sick pay (the Karenzzeit) was a similar measure.  Knappschaften 
were also aware of the role the waiting period played in discouraging Simulation.
17
Other policies tried, in effect, to develop better information on who was truly ill. Smaller 
Knappschaften hired local doctors on a part-time basis, while larger associations had full-time staff. Most 
doctors were assigned a specific set of workers as their responsibility, and were paid a fixed sum per 
worker per year, healthy or ill. Clearly such doctors had no incentive to coddle workers they did not 
believe to be truly ill (Menzel 1989, p.101). This “parish” (Sprengel) system for doctors preceded the 
1865 reforms; Bülow (1905, p.33) reports its existence in the Märkischer KV from 1840.  
 Similarly, this policy 
would make type II Simulation more expensive for the miner. Wirtz (1911, p. 106) notes that when the 
Ruhr Knappschaften introduced a policy in 1867 of making claimants wait three days (not including a 
Sunday) to receive payment, they could increased sick pay per day by fifty percent and still reduce total 
costs. Note that the implications of the Karenzzeit for Type III Simulation are different. For someone who 
really was sick for three days, this policy does not change the marginal cost of additional days of 
“sickness.”  
In other cases, the Elders or their designees oversaw designation of sick cases. This naturally 
made the Elders less effective as worker representatives, because they were in effect policing Simulation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ordnet der Oberschlesische Knappschaftsverein an, der eine ambulante Behandlung seiner Mitglieder nicht kennt, 
sondern in allen Erkrankungsfällen die Unterbringung in einem Krankenhaus anordnet. ... Die Erfolge des 
Oberschlesischen Knappschaftsvereins mit seinem so genannten Lazarettzwang sind gut. ... Die Bergleute 
empfinden den Lazarettzwang als Freiheitsbeschränkung.“ Imbusch (1910, p.42) agrees, noting that this 
Knappschaft owned nine of its own hospitals, and that in 1881, 69 percent of its sick members were treated there 
(the implication being that the rest were treated in hospitals not owned by the Knappschaft). This hospital rule 
echoes the arguments made for the “workhouse test” under England’s New Poor Law. The workhouse was 
expensive, but by forcing paupers to receive relief there, the workhouse both screened out applicants who were not 
truly in need, and it increased incentives to take actions that would keep the person from needing the Poor Law 
(Besley, Coate, and Guinnane 2003) 
17 Friendly Societies used a similar waiting period (Riley 1997, p.283), as did many of the sickness funds studied by 
Murray. 19 
 
and were thus resented by workers. Some Knappschaften hired additional employees to help deal with the 
problem. The Bochum Allgemeine Knappschaftsverein introduced in 1893 a system whereby trustees 
(Vertrauensmänner) could pay home visits to any worker who claimed to be ill. They visited nearly forty 
percent of sick members (Lauf 2006, p.288), a figure high enough presumably to worry those who made 
false claims. Bülow (1905, p.34) notes that the Märkischer Knappschaftsverein introduced a special 
“sickness controller” for Bochum in 1860, but that, in the face of considerable protest the Älteste backed 
down. If this type of system could be made to work, it would reduce all three kinds of Simulation. But 
Riley (1997, p.101) argues that the equivalent in Friendly Societies were viewed as spies. To the extent 
the Knappschaft’s methods undermined the solidarity that made miners think of the organization as their 
own, such methods could backfire.  
 
4. Empirical strategy 
The rest of this paper reports indirect tests for the existence of moral hazard. We rely heavily on the 
rich annual reports the Knappschaften made to either the Prussian or Bavarian governments. The data 
were published separately for each Knappschaft, grouped together in large administrative districts 
(Oberbergamtsabezirk in Prussia, Berginspektionsbezirk in Bavaria) that correspond to the government 
apparatus for oversight of mines and Knappschaften.  The districts are named for the cities where their 
offices were located: Bonn, Breslau, Clausthal, Dortmund, and Halle in Prussia; and Bayreuth, München, 
and Zweibrücken in Bavaria. Figure 2 is a map of Germany, using its pre-1918 borders, that locates each 
region. Appendix A gives precise sources for the variables we use. These regions comprise the primary 
mining areas located in Prussia, as well as most of those located in Bavaria, and include the vast majority 
of all Knappschaften in Germany. Our data allows us to overcome problems that have limited earlier 
efforts to examine moral-hazard and related problems in historical sickness funds. We know the age-
composition of our KV members, for example, and can control for that in our models. More generally, 
our panel allows us to experiment with controls for unobserved heterogeneity among Knappschaften. 20 
 
One reason Knappschaften varied greatly in size was that some small ones merged. Sometimes the 
resulting Knappschaft was new (that is, it did not exist until the fusion) while other times a small one was 
merged into a pre-existing Knappschaft. Prussia saw a long series of fusions in which a larger KV 
absorbed a smaller. (Figure 3 and Table 1 report the number of Knappschaften by district.) Sometimes the 
same KV was involved twice; the Märkischer KV, for example, absorbed the Königsberger KV in 1877, 
and in turn was one of the three Knappschaften that merged to form the huge Allgemeiner 
Knappschaftsverein Bochum in 1890. Fusion was less common in Bavaria, although in 1902, ten KVs 
joined to form the new Knappschaftsverein Bayreuth.
18
We have been unable, despite considerable effort, to locate archival material that would allow us to 
examine the effect of Knappschaft policies on the behavior of individual workers. We are thus forced to 
work with aggregates by Knappschaft-year. Thus we are unable to determine whether a particular policy 
affects all members a little or a minority of members a great deal. There are two other limitations to the 
data. The first is some missing years, which we do not think we can overcome because the Knappschaft 
never sent in the requisite report. For single years this problem is not terribly important; it just means that 
 The possibility of fusion raises a problem that we 
do not address in this paper: at some level, Knappschaft size was endogenous. Suppose the member's 
desire to keep their small organization separate reflected, in part, their fear that the members of a larger 
organization would have different preferences, and that the preferences of the original members not be 
reflected in the policies of the new body. This logic implies that size is correlated with member 
preferences, which makes size endogenous in the models we estimate. We have a partial defense for our 
current approach. In some cases the government "suggested" that small Knappschaften merge. We do not 
know the full range of pressure the government might have brought in those cases, so cannot speculate on 
how voluntary mergers really were. To the extent they were not voluntary, we are on firm ground in our 
current approach.  
                                                           
18 The only other fusion in Bavaria in the relevant period took place in 1905. 21 
 
our panel is not quite fully balanced.
19
 
 The greater challenge is a lack of consistency across 
Knappschaften and years in the way information was reported. 
Econometric issues 
We report only fixed-effects (FE) and pooled estimates of our models. Hausman-type tests for our 
models consistently reject the consistency of the random-effects estimator. The substance of our data also 
suggests the fixed-effects model; we have the universe of Knappschaften, not a sample.
20
                                                           
19 The panel is also unbalanced because of the way we treat the fusions. 
  The more 
important issue facing this research concerns the potential endogeneity of an important regressor. We do 
not have precise information on the benefit schedules for workers in the various Knappschaften. Instead, 
we use the average benefit, computed by dividing total sick benefit payments by the total number of days 
the benefit was paid to members who received such payments. This variable (sick_pay) is arguably 
endogenous, because a Knappschaft whose workers faced higher risks of sickness would also be more 
20 One might argue for an alternative approach based on the “between effects” (BE) estimator, which estimates the 
model parameters using variation across KV, rather than within KV (as with the FE estimator). We believe the FE to 
be the better approach, because it allows us to clean out unobserved heterogeneity at the KV level. We did estimate 
all FE models reported here with the BE estimator. The results differ (if the BE and FE estimates were identical, 
then the random effects estimator would be consistent) but the BE models do not overturn the qualitative 
implications of what we report below. We do not report detailed results relating to two other issues. One might think 
that if sickness reflects persistent shocks to the KV, our data would observe an AR(1) or AR(2) process. This 
possibility implies that our estimates are consistent (but inefficient) and that our standard errors are incorrect. We re-
estimated the models reported here using a HAC estimator. The point estimates are nearly identical to those we 
report. The standard errors are usually larger, but the t-ratios rarely fall below conventional significance levels.  
More seriously, the process we are modeling might be dynamic, in the sense that outcomes today would depend on 
outcomes in prior years.  For example, suppose the Knappschaft experiences a year in which many members claim 
sick pay. This might provoke an effort, in the next year, to be stricter about controlling who gets such benefits.  This 
example suggests a dynamic relationship that would bias our estimates if we did not take the dynamic structure into 
account. We re-estimated the models reported here using versions of the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator. 
That model relies on the assertion that first differences in the exogenous regressors can serve as instruments for the 
(endogenous) lagged dependent variable. In our case, first-differencing results in the loss of many observations, 
given the lack of full balance in the panel. Estimating our models for a subset of KV with complete data leads to two 
generalizations about the dynamic model. First, the dynamic specification is better in the sense that the lagged 
dependent variables are statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. The second-period lagged 
dependent variable tends to be more important than its one-period lag. The relationship is unexpectedly positive; 
more sick days in the previous period implies more today. This result is contrary to our expectation, because we had 
assumed the KV would react in ways that would reduce sick claims. Second, the results of interest do not change 
materially in the dynamic specifications. In most specifications the effects of interest have the same signs and 
similar magnitudes, but the standard errors are larger. 22 
 
likely to offer generous benefits.
21 (The variable suffers from a distinct problem caused by the Karenzzeit; 
if a hundred workers are ill for one day each, then our variable would be zero, but a single worker ill for 
one hundred days would be paid for 97 of them.) As an instrument for sick_pay we require a variable that 
is correlated with sick_pay but uncorrelated with the error term in our second-stage equation. The IV 
results reported here all use the firm’s contribution per KV member as an instrument for the generosity of 
sick pay. This instrument meets the exclusion restriction, as there is no reason to think miners cared about 
the firm’s per-member costs in deciding whether to report sick. The “first-stage” regressions we report 
below also show that the instrument is strongly correlated with the endogenous variable, as it must be.
22
In much of our analysis we divide the Knappschaften into two groups and estimate separate but 
identical specifications. This approach reflects the robust finding that larger, more rapidly-growing KV 
behaved differently from the smaller, shrinking associations. We cannot say precisely why this 
relationship holds so strongly, but suspect that it reflects differences in perceptions of the future. A 
worker presumably thinks differently about abusing an institution he doubts will exist in ten years. One 
could think of the distinction as size or growth rate of membership. The growth rate distinction is more 
robust. The precise dividing line does not affect the results; here we split the data at the median growth 
rate of 1.8 percent per year. Splitting the data at a growth rate of zero produces nearly identical results, as 
does dividing the Knappschaften according to membership size, with the dividing line at 200 members. 
 
 
Definitions and proxies 
                                                           
21  During the downturn of the 1870s the Ruhr Knappschaften faced declining contributions. Their reaction 
illustrates the endogeneity issue: “… An der Höhe der Kassenleistungen, das wurde als Grundsatz aufgestellt, sollte 
nicht gerüttelt werden, und ein Antrag auf Ermächtigung des Vorstands zur zeitweisen Ermäßigung des 
Krankengeldes bis zu 75% wurde abgelehnt. Nach einigen Monaten jedoch, als sich zeigte, dass im Essener Verein 
das Defizit im laufenden Jahr noch größer geworden war, wurde in diesem Punkte der Nachtrag zum Essener Statut 
nochmals und zwar dahin geändert, dass alle Krankengeldsätze durch den Vorstand um 1/5 ermäßigt werden sollten. 
Eine Erhöhung war erst für den Fall wieder in Aussicht genommen, wenn nach dem Ermessen des Vorstandes die 
Kasse die erhöhten Leistungen wieder tragen konnte und das Verhältnis von Löhnen und Krankengeldern eine 
Erhöhung nach dem Urteile des Vorstandes wieder zuließ (Wirtz 1911, p.112). 
22 Recent discussions of the problem of weak instruments suggest as a rule of thumb that the F-statistic associated 
with exclusion of the instrument in the first stage be at least 10.  We report t-statistics, which in this case are the 
square root of F, and in most cases they exceed the relevant value of 3.16. For a cogent discussion of the weak-
instrument issue, see Bound et al (1995).  23 
 
  We use several proxies and definitions that require discussion. Table 3 defines and gives 
descriptive statistics for each of the variables in our regressions.  We employ two different measures of 
the size of the meaningful unit in which workers operated. One is the total size of the KV (members) 
while the other is the number of members per works (members_works). Another important variable is the 
fraction of total KV expenses born by the owners (Owner_part).  
  Some arguments made by contemporaries imply that Simulation would respond to the demand for 
miner’s labor. To test this claim precisely would require KV-level production data, which is not available. 
As proxies we have assembled annual data on output of key products such as coal. Unfortunately this 
information is not available at any level less aggregated than the Oberbergamtsbezirk. We experimented 
with the production of anthracite (Steinkohl) and bituminous coal (Braunkohl) as reasonable proxies. In 
some specifications we interact them with a dummy for whether the KV in question had any mines of that 
type; in others, we found that anthracite production alone was a good proxy. 
 
Empirical implications of Simulation and Verschleppung 
  We employ two distinct strategies for identifying Simulation. Our first strategy relies on the fact 
that some diseases are more easily verified than others, and thus speaks directly to the underlying issue, 
which is the imperfect observability of health status. Presumably a miner who claims to have a broken leg 
cannot fool his doctor about this fact. But other diseases were another matter. Contemporaries focused on 
the fact that rheumatism was a sort of unverifiable catch-all term. Today we associate rheumatism with 
conditions that are real and in most cases subject to clear-cut medical tests. We do not mean to suggest 
that many miners were not suffering from the same. But it was easy in the nineteenth century to claim 
rheumatism as a cover for Simulation. Menzel (1989, p.186) cites a Knappschaft doctor who claimed that 
“The word ‘rheumatism’ excites in the populace a general sympathy, pleasing both patient and doctor. 
…nobody knows what rheumatism is. The word serves often as a cover for ignorance, as the last refuge in 
cases where the doctor seems to have been convinced that his patient, although objectively in good health, 24 
 
is suffering.”
23
Our second strategy corresponds to the approach taken in earlier work on this topic, and is more 
severe. If illness were perfectly observable and caused only by random shocks, as one expects, then there 
would be no relationship between sick days and the size or composition of payments to workers. 
Similarly, sick days would not be associated with the size of the KV or individual production units. The 
second set of models all rely on the presumption that such correlations reflect some type of moral hazard. 
There are two reasons to be cautious about this approach. One is that our results are consistent with all 
three forms of Simulation, although, as we have noted, Type II is not clearly moral hazard. A second 
concern is that these correlations could arise out of omitted variables bias or some other specification 
problem. Suppose, for example, that work in larger production units is objectively more dangerous than in 
other contexts. Then a finding that reported sick days increased with the size of the production unit would 
not necessarily be evidence of moral hazard alone. To the extent this unobserved heterogeneity is linear 
and additive, our fixed-effects models will sweep that away.  We recognize that this second group of tests 
is demanding.
 Dr. Schlockow (1881, p.160) drew a direct connection between rheumatism reports and 
Simulation, noting that this condition was easier to fake than others. He buttresses this view with the 
observation that in the Upper Silesian Knappschaft, where sickness had to be treated in hospital, 
rheumatism affected 4.8 of every hundred members per year. The similar figure for Clausthal was 26.7! 
24
                                                           
23 „Das Wort Rheumatismus erfreut sich im Volke einer allgemeinen Sympathie, es befriedigt den Patienten und 
selbst den Arzt. Leider ist es seit der Wirksamkeit der sozialpolitischen Gesetze, wie sehr auch die Wohlthaten 
derselben anzuerkennen sind, noch mehr zu Ehren gekommen, obwohl niemand, selbst der Arzt nicht, weiß, was 
Rheuma ist. Das Wort dient gar zu häufig als Deckmantel der Unwissenheit, als letztes Refugium in den Fällen, in 
welchem der Arzt die Überzeugung gewonnen zu haben scheint, dass sein Klient, obgleich den objektiven 
Erscheinungen nach gesund, dennoch leidend ist.“ Deshalb schlägt Tenhold vor: „Die Diagnose ‚Rheumatismus und 
Neurasthenie’ von den Krankenscheinen wenigstens ganz zu verbannen. In den meisten Fällen, wo solche 
Diagnosen vorliegen, wird man entweder eine bestimmte Organerkrankung nachweisen oder den Mann, sei es der 
Übertreibung, sei es der Simulation, überführen können.“ 
 
24 Several earlier studies attempt to test for moral hazard in funds of this type. Most, including Murray (2005), infer 
moral hazard as we do in section 6 here: from the sensitivity of the number of sick days claimed to measures of sick 
pay. Our sick pay measure is identical to that used by Murray (2005). Our approach differs from earlier studies in 
two respects. Some datasets have individual-level data on actual or potential fund members (for example, some 
sources used in Murray (2007), as well as Gottlieb (2007). This type of source permits modeling of the observed 
worker-level heterogeneity, but these sources are always a single cross-section, and thus make it difficult to 
distinguish moral hazard from unobserved heterogeneity. Our dataset is unusual in that it is fund-level. Murray 
(2005) also uses a panel in which the observations are country-years. 25 
 
 
5. Evidence from causes of illness 
The apparent incidence of rheumatism varied dramatically across KV. In the median year, most 
Knappschaften saw fewer than ten such claims per hundred members. The exceptions tended to be 
extreme. The Neusalzwerker KV had 55 claims per hundred members in some years. More instructive is 
the apparent persistence of this rheumatism crisis.  For three-quarters of the years in our data, the 
Neusalzwerker KV had at least 47 reports of rheumatism per 100 members. This empirical pattern 
suggests a simple test for the presence of moral hazard: do lost work days due to rheumatism vary 
differently from reports of other causes of illness? More precisely, do the determinants of rheumatism 
cases suggest that it was used, as suggested, as a cover for Simulation? As a control, we compare the data 
on rheumatism to the data on bruises and contusions (Quetschungen).
25
Figures 4 and 5 report the unweighted means and standard deviations of the incidence of rheumatism 
and contusions in Prussia (Bavarian Knappschaften did not report this information). Two patterns stand 
out. Over the period for which we have this information (1867-1884), rheumatism became relatively less 
common, but it varied much more dramatically over time than did reports of contusions. Figure 5 shows 
that the dispersion of apparent rheumatism across Knappschaften was significantly greater than for 
contusions. The information contained in these graphs strongly suggests that rheumatism was being used 
as a cover for simulation; the underlying “true” causes of the condition would not vary as much over time 
or across Knappschaften. Table 4 reports FE estimates of the determinants of the difference between 
reported rheumatism and contusions in a given KV, separately for the stagnant and dynamic KVs. This 
“difference” approach allows us to control in a clean way for cross-KV differences in factors that affect 
 Contusions were a fact of life for 
miners, and legitimately led to lost days of work. But unlike rheumatism, contusions are normally entirely 
observable to a medical practitioner. Moreover, most accidents leading to bruises and contusions would 
be well-known to other miners, whereas a worker with true rheumatism has no way of credibly signaling 
that fact to his fellows. 
                                                           
25 Some KV reported various types of rheumatism and contusions. We aggregate them into two general categories. 26 
 
either type of illness. We estimated (but do not report) separate models, and those suggest that most of the 
correlation between the difference and the right-hand side variables in our models reflects correlations 
with rheumatism. The models discussed in this section tend to be fragile. We experimented with several 
different approaches. The underlying problem is that data on illness stops in 1884, and some KV were not 
always consistent in even reporting the data. Table 5 reports elasticities pertaining to the models reported 
in Table 4. 
The instrument for sick_pay here is as noted above; the F-statistic for the instrument in the first stage 
exceeds 3.5 for each model except column (2). Re-estimating that particular model without the instrument 
produces, not surprisingly, results similar to those reported.    The models include year effects, but they 
are not statistically significant. The results show that rheumatism responded strongly to increases in 
sick_pay and, for stagnant KV, to increases in the portion of total costs covered by the firms. The pooled 
model for stagnant Knappschaften explains a relatively large portion of the variation in the dependent 
variable. Only in the dynamic KV do we see any evidence of two other issues stressed by contemporaries. 
Knappschaften with a larger overall membership, in the pooled specification, had significantly less 
rheumatism. This may reflect a scale economy in measures to control simulation, such as a hospitalization 
policy. And dynamic KV saw relatively less rheumatism when anthracite production increased. This 
finding is consistent with the claims that reduction in miner pay affected simulation by changing the 
opportunity cost of a day off work.  
 
6. Evidence from sick days and cases 
 
  The rheumatism proxy yield sharp, clean results, but only for part of our period. We turn next to 
measures of the overall behavior of miners in a Knappschaft: how many claimed to be sick and for how 
long, and how those measures varied with the incentives to make false reports. There are several ways to 
measure the extent to which miners drew on sick pay. One measure is available for all KV for the entire 
range of our dataset, and that is the total number of sick days for the Knappschaft in a year, divided by its 
membership in that year. Only the Prussian KV reported the data needed for two additional measures, 27 
 
unfortunately. One is the total number of cases of illness in the year, and the second is the mean number 
of days lost per case of illness.  
  We begin with days of illness per Knappschaft member, for which we have complete information. 
Table 6 reports three fixed-effects models each for all KV (columns (1)-(3)), for those growing more 
rapidly than the median (columns 4-6), and for those growing more slowly than the median (columns (7)-
(9)). For each group we report a FE regression, an analogous FE IV regression, and the “first stage” from 
that IV regression. The first stage has independent, substantive interest, because it amounts to a model of 
how sick pay is determined. Our regressors include sick_pay and firm_part, which reflect the extent to the 
miner can take a day off at someone else’s expense, as well as two measures of size, members and 
members_works, which measure the putative size effect in moral hazard. The regressions include the coal 
variable used in the cause-of-sickness regressions. We introduce dummies for 1887 and later and 1905 
and later, to capture any influence of the Reich policy changes.
26
  The IV models demonstrate the importance of treating sick_pay as endogenous. In the basic FE 
model sick pay has a negative effect, which is precisely what the reverse causation would imply. In the IV 
specifications it is always either positive or effectively zero, which is what we expect: the greater is sick 
pay, the greater the incentive to report sick.  Focusing on the IV results, we see that the model does not 
explain behavior in the slow-growing KV well. Most impacts are imprecisely estimated. The best 
interpretation of the model is that these Knappschaften did not suffer moral-hazard problems that 
manifested in large numbers of sick days per worker. The results for the fast-growing KV are strikingly 
different. The IV estimate for sick_pay is essentially zero, but firm_part led to more reported illness, a 
sure indicator that workers conditioned their behavior on who was paying.  In faster-growth 
Knappschaften the size of the unit has two effects. A larger KV per se leads to slightly more Simulation, 
 (Table 9 collects  the main elasticities 
from  models we discuss in this section). 
                                                           
26 These and later regressions include unreported controls for the age-structure of the Knappschaft’s membership. 
Collectively these controls are always only borderline significant. Surprisingly, older workers seemed less likely to 
claim sick pay. This correlation may reflect the practice of allowing older miners to shift to less dangerous work 
often on the surface. 28 
 
while larger individual production units leads to much more. The second elasticity is much larger (.047) 
than the former (.020). If larger Knappschaften were able to capture scale economies to reduce the extent 
of Simulation, we would expect the first elasticity to be negative. Our coal-production proxy does not 
have the expected negative impact on sick days; greater production actually increases sickness, which is 
what one would expect if hard work leads to injuries. 
The two mandates from the Reich each increased reported sickness for the dynamic KVs but not 
the others. The 1887 law, which made all KVs adhere to the rules for the other sickness funds, increased 
reported sickness by about 7 percent. The 1905 changes had a slightly greater effect. In each case, there 
were two important changes: minimum sick pay increased, and the period over which the miner could 
receive that pay increased.  
  We now turn to the “first stage” regressions, which in this case tell us how Knappschaften 
determined the level of benefits they offered. The model for the slow-growing KV does a much better job 
of explaining sick pay than does the second stage. The 1887 reform forced all associations to increase sick 
pay. Other impacts differ across the two groups. A larger KV offers more sick pay to members in a dying 
KV but not in a dynamic one. Both types offer more pay if the production units are larger. Both pay more 
when demand for coal is high. 
  The models reported in Table 6 include the Knappschaften in Silesia. These KV all supposedly 
introduced a rule that required all illnesses to be treated in hospital, although we unfortunately do not 
know when the KVs adopted these rules. We are not convinced that the rules were enforced in any 
consistent way; the proportion of all illnesses treated in hospital in Silesian institutions varies widely 
across KV and even over time within a single association. On average, the Silesian Knappschaften treated 
57 percent of cases in hospital. The next-largest proportion is in Bonn, with only 8 percent on average. 
But the distributions overlap. The Lower Silesian KV, for example, often reported as few as 10 percent of 
all sick miners treated in hospital. This different policy in Silesian raises the question of whether these 
Knappschaften should be included with others in our models. If it were really true that they forced all sick 
miners to hospital, then we should not, as all the incentives for Simulation would be different. To examine 29 
 
this question, we re-estimated the models reported in Table 6 separately for Silesian and non-Silesian 
Knappschaften. The results are slightly different, but none of our basic observations are overturned. So 
we continue to combine all the KV. 
  Ours is just one measure of moral hazard, but the results strongly suggest that contemporary 
commentators only partly understood the mechanisms underlying the growth of KV costs. The size 
effects contemporaries emphasized were definitely present: Knappschaften with larger production units 
definitely experienced more sickness claims. But these effects are slight compared to the impact of more 
generous pay, especially when that sick pay is funded by the owners. And, to the extent our coal-
production proxy is a good measure of the demand for miner labor, there is little evidence that the 
Simulation reflected disguised unemployment. 
 
Cases of illness 
  We now turn to the number of cases of reported illness. The number of sick cases approximates 
the number of times a worker paid the implicit cost of the Karenzzeit. Modeling sick cases thus allows us 
to separate, in theory, Types I and II Simulation on the one hand, from Type III on the other. This 
information is unfortunately only available for Prussian KV. Table 7 reports models strictly parallel to 
those in Table 6, but this time the dependent variable is the number of cases of illness per Knappschaft 
member. In the IV results for all KV and for the dynamic associations, the signs on sick pay, firm_part, 
and the two size-of-association variables are as expected, and similar to the results in Table 6.
27
 
 But we 
now see another impact of the 1887 and 1905 reforms. In both cases, the reported number of cases of 
sickness declines. In the absence of any change in Knappschaft practice, we would expect the Reich 
measures to increase reported sickness. Clearly this reflects the Knappschaften trying to control costs; if 
the number of illnesses had not declined, the greater sick pay could have overwhelmed the fund.  
Length of illness 
                                                           
27 The first-stage results here differ from the early model because these data are only available for the Prussian KV. 30 
 
  We turn now to the mean length of reported illness, which again is only available for Prussian 
Knappschaften. This dependent variable differs from the one used in Table 6 because we in effect 
condition on whether a member was ill at all. Table 8 reports regressions parallel to those in Tables 6 and 
7. The results here contain some surprises. Increased sick pay shortens reported illnesses, the model 
claims (although the impact is not statistically significant in the IV specifications). The firm’s share of 
total costs has a large, positive impact on the length of illness. The 1905 reform increased the duration of 
illnesses, but the effect is small if statistically significant. Table 8 illustrates the multiple tools available to 
Knappschaften that worried about Simulation. The 1905 reform, for example, doubled the maximum 
period for sick benefit. This would seem an invitation to Type III malingering, but the actual increase is 
rather small. This result presumably reflects the KV’s fears about what could happen after 1905, and their 
efforts to combat the problem.  
Table 9 reports elasticities from these last three models to summarize the determinants of our 
several measures of Simulation. There is no reason these impacts should all be similar; for example, when 
the Reich forced Knappschaften to extend more generous benefits, one might well expect that the KV 
would try to reduce Simulation and thus achieve a reduction in the number of sick cases (Table 7), leaving 
only the truly sick and thus long average periods of illness (Table 8). This outcome would have an 
ambiguous effect on overall sick days per member (Table 6). In any case, there are some overall 
generalizations to draw from our models. First, firms that shouldered a greater share of the KV’s costs 
experienced higher levels of sickness. The same goes for Knappschaften with relatively large production 
units. That this effect is zero in the last model suggests that the information and informal sanctions 
available to workers in smaller enterprises only worked to discourage shorter periods of malingering. 
Finally, the two reforms in our period produced precisely what we would expect if there was significant 
malingering beforehand: when forced to pay greater benefits for a longer period, the Knappschaften found 
ways to reduce the number of cases of illness (Table 7) at the expense of longer average illnesses. The 
later, of course, is not really a cost, if it meant the Knappschaften were now concentrating resources on he 
truly ill. 31 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
  The Knappschaften grew out of medieval miners’ efforts to insure themselves against the 
economic consequences of their dangerous jobs. By the late nineteenth century the KV were state-
sanctioned, self-run sickness funds. Membership was compulsory for workers in covered industries, and 
the individual Knappschaften had considerable autonomy over important policy decisions. Bismarck’s 
social-insurance legislation used them as the model for similar funds in other industries, and as such they 
remain the model for German illness and accident insurance today. 
  Late nineteenth-century observers noted that Knappschaften experienced strong growth in the 
number of days their members claimed to be sick. Contemporaries blamed this development on 
Simulation, or feigning illness, and thought it reflected changes in the miners’ social status and the 
deterioration of social ties among KV members brought about by increases in the size and territory of 
individual associations. This paper uses aggregate data on the Knappschaften to test these claims. We find 
that there was indeed considerable Simulation, as suggested by huge variations in the incidence of 
rheumatism and its strong correlation with proxies for the attractiveness of feigning illness. Turning to the 
determinants of reported sickness itself, we find that in growing Knappschaften, miners were attuned to 
both the generosity of sick pay and the portion of the KV’s costs paid for by owners. Contemporaries 
were also correct that as the units in which miners worked grew larger, apparent incidents of illness 
became more common. We find little evidence for a potential offsetting effect; ; larger Knappschaften 
apparently did not find  ways to use their size to achieve efficiencies in monitoring, medical treatment, or 
both. Finally, we find that Simulation in the many shrinking Knappschaften took a different form; we 
know it was considerable, but it apparently was not strongly correlated with observable KV 
characteristics. Membership in a dying organization seemed enough to bring out the strongest moral-
hazard problems. 
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Table 1: Numbers of Knappschaften, by District, Prussia and Bavaria, 1861-1914
a 
 
                           
    Prussia (Oberbergamtsbezirke)    Bavaria (Berginspektionsbezirke)   
                           
    Bonn  Breslau  Clausthal  Dortmund  Halle  Sum    Bayreuth  München  Zweibrücken  Sum   
                           
1862    43  4  -  11  19  77    n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.   
1867    47  4  -  15  19  85    n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.   
1872    47  4  6  15  17  89    n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.   
1877    45  4  9  14  12  84    n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.   
1882    44  4  9  14  12  83    n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.   
1884    44  4  9  14  12  83    9  19  10  38   
1887    43  3  4  14  13  77    9  19  12  40   
1892    43  3  4  11  13  74    9  19  13  41   
1897    43  3  4  10  13  73    9  19  13  41   
1902    41  3  4  12  13  73    9  10  13  32   
1907    40  3  4  11  12  70    9  9  10  28   
1912    34  3  4  10  11  62    9  9  10  28   
                           
Notes:  The Bavarian statistics begin in 1884. 
Source: Statistik der Knappschaftsvereine des preussischen Staates und Statistik der Knappschafts- vereine im 
bayerischen Staate. 
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Table 2: Summary of main legistlative changes affecting Knappschaften 
 
Year  Level of Government  Nature of change 
1865  Prussia (Bavaria 
followed suit in 1865) 
Required contributions from firms 
1887  Reich  Knappschaft becomes part of general sickness and accident 
insurance system. Most KV have to increase sick payments; new 
law also requires maximum of 13 weeks sick benefit 
1905  Reich  Further increases sick pay and doubles maximum benefit to 26 
weeks 
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Table 3: Means, standard deviations, and definitions of main variables 
Variable name  Mean  S.D.  Definition 
Sick days  7.42  4.54  Number of sick days per KV member 
Sick case  .63  .33  Number of cases of illness per KV member 
Sickness length  13.55  6.50  Average number of days for each sick case 
Sick pay  0.95  0.63  Mean sick pay per sick day (Marks) 
Firm part  0.43  0.11  Portion of all KV costs paid by firms 
Members  4.06  17.07  Total membership of KV (‘000s) 
Member per works  0.32  0.57  Membership per works (‘000s) 
Coal  14.09  11.91  Coal production (defined at regional level) (Millions of Tons) 
Firm part per member  22.20  28.57  Total firm contributions to KV, per KV member 
Rheum  0.10  0.11  Rheumatism cases per KV member 
Quet  0.06  0.05  Contusion cases per KV member 
Note: Means and standard deviations are pooled across all years and Knappschaften. 
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Table 4: Determinants of the difference between rheumatism and contusions, 1867-1884 
             
             
 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  FE/All KV  FE/Stagnant KV  FE/Dynamic KV  Pooled/All KV  Pooled/Stagnant KV  Pooled/Dynamic KV 
             
Sick pay  0.182  0.327  0.111  -0.002  -0.092  0.144 
  (2.069)  (2.341)  (0.817)  (-0.047)  (-1.427)  (2.000) 
Firm's part  0.043  0.210  0.040  0.102  0.135  -0.029 
  (0.717)  (2.014)  (0.417)  (3.024)  (2.197)  (-0.463) 
Members  -0.005  -0.016  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.940)  (-1.394)  (-0.316)  (-2.310)  (-0.313)  (-2.515) 
Workers/works  -0.011  0.019  -0.029  -0.001  -0.003  -0.007 
  (-0.596)  (0.577)  (-1.054)  (-0.164)  (-0.182)  (-0.814) 
Soft coal  0.008  -0.061  0.046  -0.015  -0.005  0.006 
  (0.250)  (-0.993)  (1.140)  (-0.895)  (-0.139)  (0.208) 
Hard coal  0.001  0.001  0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.424)  (0.167)  (0.597)  (-4.054)  (-0.914)  (-3.458) 
Constant  -0.050  -0.177  -0.018  0.019  0.054  -0.003 
  (-1.342)  (-1.962)  (-0.432)  (1.303)  (1.175)  (-0.173) 
             
Observations  528  231  297  528  231  297 
R-squared        0.166  0.214  0.025 
Number of code  56  19  37       
 
Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios     38 
 
 
Table 5:  Evaluation of “difference” model for cause of illness 
 
  Stagnant KVs  Dynamic KVs 
 
  Fixed-effects 
model 
Pooled model  Fixed-effects 
model 
Pooled model 
 
Elasticities 
evaluated at the 
mean: 
       
         
Sick pay  7.10  -1.99  2.85  3.71 
 
Firm’s portions of 
costs 
2.83  1.82  .63  -.46 
 
 
Members in all  -.97  -.04  -.24  -.15 
 
Members per 
works 
.17  -.03  -.38  -.09 
 
 
Brown coal 
production 
 
-.09  -.01  .06  .08 
 
Anthracite 
production 
.03  -.08  .20  -.30 
         
         
Bold figures correspond to elasticities that are different from zero, in a two-tailed test, at a 95-percent confidence interval 
 
Source: Computed from regressions in Table 4 
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Table 6: Determinants of sick days per Knappschaft member 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  All Knappschaften  Dynamic KV  Stagnant KV 
  FE  IV   First stage  FE  IV   First stage  FE  IV   First stage 
                   
Sick pay per day  -0.761  11.723    -1.453  -2.256    -0.557  220.881   
  (-4.747)  (2.712)    (-4.882)  (-1.240)    (-2.802)  (0.267)   
Firm's portion of costs  3.890  3.463  -0.021  3.549  3.711  0.103  2.804  71.451  -0.289 
  (4.191)  (1.902)  (-0.160)  (3.407)  (3.356)  (1.008)  (1.653)  (0.271)  (-0.886) 
KV members in 000s  0.017  0.074  -0.004  0.019  0.016  -0.004  -1.275  -4.918  0.038 
  (2.075)  (2.911)  (-3.414)  (2.540)  (1.447)  (-5.733)  (-6.295)  (-0.316)  (1.078) 
Workers per unit in 1000s  0.615  -0.188  0.071  0.852  0.896  0.059  -0.680  -2.769  0.043 
  (3.912)  (-0.454)  (3.362)  (5.757)  (5.031)  (4.252)  (-0.872)  (-0.092)  (0.325) 
Coal production in million tons  0.007  -0.033  0.008  0.023  0.028  0.010  -0.019  0.895  0.007 
  (0.589)  (-1.201)  (6.386)  (1.806)  (1.632)  (9.745)  (-0.687)  (0.251)  (2.248) 
1887 and later  0.286  -2.362  0.297  1.060  1.235  0.287  -0.451  -45.309  0.304 
  (1.357)  (-2.354)  (13.691)  (4.126)  (2.637)  (16.545)  (-1.303)  (-0.270)  (6.086) 
1905 and later  1.538  1.853  -0.007  1.007  1.021  0.043  1.947  13.294  -0.058 
  (6.188)  (3.721)  (-0.212)  (3.445)  (3.463)  (1.601)  (4.555)  (0.294)  (-0.779) 
Year  0.000  -0.123    -0.020  -0.014    0.049  -3.357   
  (0.034)  (-2.483)    (-1.407)  (-0.700)    (1.942)  (-0.264)   
Firm costs per member      0.004      0.004      0.004 
      (4.379)      (6.640)      (1.331) 
Constant  6.056  224.892  0.897  45.144  34.019  0.773  -81.197  6,038.186  1.062 
  (0.252)  (2.526)  (8.265)  (1.662)  (0.922)  (8.676)  (-1.735)  (0.264)  (4.459) 
                   
Observations  2241  2241  2241  1307  1307  1307  934  934  934 
Number of groups  78  78  78  48  48  48  30  30  30 
Within r-square  .075      .119      .125     
Between “”  .053      .014      .009     
Overall “”  .062      .089      .012     
Note: All models include Knappschaft-level fixed effects and controls for age-structure. 
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Table 7: Determinants of the number of sick cases 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  All Knappschaften  Dynamic Knappschaften  Stagnant Knappschaften 
  FE  IV   First stage  FE  IV   First stage  FE  IV  First stage 
Sick pay per day  0.074  0.821    0.073  0.078    0.127  4.546   
  (2.514)  (3.694)    (2.193)  (0.378)    (2.034)  (2.837)   
Firm's portion of costs  0.009  -0.132  -0.021  0.142  0.141  0.103  -0.259  -0.981  -0.289 
  (0.088)  (-1.051)  (-0.160)  (1.185)  (1.104)  (1.008)  (-1.358)  (-1.628)  (-0.886) 
KV members in 000s  -0.000  0.003  -0.004  0.000  0.000  -0.004  -0.098  -0.173  0.038 
  (-0.527)  (2.047)  (-3.414)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (-5.733)  (-5.085)  (-2.820)  (1.078) 
Workers per unit in 1000s  0.084  0.034  0.071  0.090  0.089  0.059  0.222  0.055  0.043 
  (5.288)  (1.450)  (3.362)  (5.555)  (4.520)  (4.252)  (2.928)  (0.244)  (0.325) 
Coal production in million tons  -0.002  -0.005  0.008  -0.002  -0.002  0.010  -0.003  0.006  0.007 
  (-1.267)  (-2.789)  (6.386)  (-1.110)  (-0.806)  (9.745)  (-0.978)  (0.661)  (2.248) 
1887 and later  -0.024  -0.188  0.297  -0.013  -0.014  0.287  -0.042  -0.906  0.304 
  (-1.013)  (-3.386)  (13.691)  (-0.436)  (-0.258)  (16.545)  (-1.060)  (-2.737)  (6.086) 
1905 and later  -0.097  -0.077  -0.007  -0.170  -0.170  0.043  -0.020  0.125  -0.058 
  (-3.594)  (-2.387)  (-0.212)  (-5.050)  (-5.044)  (1.601)  (-0.424)  (0.889)  (-0.779) 
Year  -0.003  -0.009    -0.003  -0.003    -0.002  -0.066   
  (-2.027)  (-3.724)    (-1.745)  (-1.331)    (-0.889)  (-2.722)   
Firm costs per members      0.004      0.004      0.004 
      (4.379)      (6.640)      (1.331) 
Constant  5.843  17.452  0.897  5.706  5.771  0.773  5.647  121.241  1.062 
  (2.246)  (3.829)  (8.265)  (1.866)  (1.462)  (8.676)  (1.087)  (2.742)  (4.459) 
                   
Observations  1933  1933  2241  1201  1201  1307  732  732  934 
Number of code  64  64  78  43  43  48  21  21  30 
Within r-square  .060      .079      .102     
Between “”  0      0      .014     
Overall “”  .029      .027      .015     
 
Note: All models include Knappschaft-level fixed effects and controls for age-structure. 
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Table 8: Determinants of lengths of illnesses 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  All Knappschaften  Dynamic Knappschaften  Stagnant Knappschaften 
  FE  IV  First Stage  FE  IV  First Stage  FE  IV  First Stage 
                   
Sick pay per day  -4.432  -7.172    -3.574  -7.819    -7.288  -36.944   
  (-7.337)  (-1.811)    (-5.749)  (-1.984)    (-5.111)  (-2.268)   
Firm's portion of costs  5.385  5.902  -0.021  3.877  4.788  0.103  2.933  7.780  -0.289 
  (2.563)  (2.637)  (-0.160)  (1.725)  (1.962)  (1.008)  (0.676)  (1.270)  (-0.886) 
KV members in 000s  0.031  0.019  -0.004  0.040  0.022  -0.004  -0.260  0.240  0.038 
  (1.801)  (0.795)  (-3.414)  (2.581)  (0.971)  (-5.733)  (-0.591)  (0.386)  (1.078) 
Workers per unit in 1000s  -0.698  -0.515  0.071  -0.235  0.003  0.059  -6.124  -5.004  0.043 
  (-2.133)  (-1.226)  (3.362)  (-0.777)  (0.009)  (4.252)  (-3.552)  (-2.197)  (0.325) 
Coal production in million tons  0.051  0.063  0.008  0.044  0.072  0.010  0.007  -0.050  0.007 
  (1.983)  (2.030)  (6.386)  (1.674)  (1.933)  (9.745)  (0.116)  (-0.563)  (2.248) 
1887 and later  0.713  1.313  0.297  0.760  1.715  0.287  0.669  6.472  0.304 
  (1.460)  (1.329)  (13.691)  (1.374)  (1.647)  (16.545)  (0.748)  (1.923)  (6.086) 
1905 and later  5.484  5.407  -0.007  4.888  4.926  0.043  6.441  5.467  -0.058 
  (9.819)  (9.451)  (-0.212)  (7.714)  (7.610)  (1.601)  (6.147)  (3.810)  (-0.779) 
Year  0.113  0.137    0.073  0.103    0.248  0.671   
  (3.929)  (3.060)    (2.367)  (2.466)    (3.895)  (2.741)   
Firm costs per member      0.004      0.004      0.004 
      (4.379)      (6.640)      (1.331) 
Constant  -196.527  -239.124  0.897  -120.225  -172.438  0.773  -448.565  -1,224.411  1.062 
  (-3.667)  (-2.942)  (8.265)  (-2.094)  (-2.280)  (8.676)  (-3.788)  (-2.724)  (4.459) 
                   
Observations  1933  1933  2241  1201  1201  1307  732  732  934 
Number of groups  64  64  78  43  43  48  21  21  30 
Within r-square  .183      .175      .256     
Between “”  .003      .040      .006     
Overall “”  .086      .103      .121     
Note: All models include Knappschaft-level fixed effects and controls for age-structure. 
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Table 9: Summary of Moral Hazard Effects 
   
Sick days per member  Sick cases per KV 
member 
Sick days per case of 
illness 
 
Sick pay  -.276  .109  -.507 
Firm share of costs  .213  .094  .148 
Total KV membership  .020  .001  .016 
Members/works  .047  .056  0 
Coal production  .055  0.036  .077 
1887 and later  .066  -.009  .054 
1905 and later  .085  -.016  0.022 
 
Source: IV Regressions reported in tables 6-8. 
Note: Figures reported are elasticities evaluated at the mean. Figures in bold are associated with a t-ratio 
greater than 1.9 
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Sources: Social insurance data for 1885 to 1913 are from David Khoudour-Castéras (2008), “Welfare 
State and Labor Mobility: The Impact of Bismarck’s Social Legislation on German Emigration before 
World War I,”Journal of Economic History, 68(1), 211-243, and from Johannes Frerich and Martin Frey 
(1993), Handbuch der Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland: Von der industriellen Zeit bis zum Ende 
des Dritten Reiches (Bd. 1), München/Wien, pp. 102-106; Knappschaft data are from the Statistik der 
Knappschaftsvereine des preussischen Staates as detailed in Appendix A. 
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Figure 1: Knappschaft members as percentage of 
total membership of sickness and accident-
insurance funds under the Reich
Sickness funds Accident funds44 
 
 
Figure 2: Locator map of the mining administration regions (Oberbergamtsbezirken)  
 
 
 
Note: White areas are those lacking mines or outside the mining regions administered by Prussia and 
Bavaria. We refer to the districts by the name of the city from which the district was administered. 
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Figure 3: Number of Knappschaften, Prussia and Bavaria, 1867-1914 
 
Source: Statistik der Knappschaftsvereine des Preussischen Staates and Statistik der Knappschaftsvereine 
im bayerischen Staate. 
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Figure 4: Rheumatism and contusions, 1867-1884 
Unweighted means of reports per member 
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Figure 5: Standard deviations of rheumatism and contusions 
Unweighted 
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Appendix A: Data sources  
 
         
A. Preußen  
(1)   Statistik der Knappschaftsvereine des Preussischen Staates  
                      (erschienen in: Zeitschrift für das Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen im Preussischen Staate, Ministerium für öffentliche Arbeiten/   
                      Ministerium für Handel und Gewerbe, Jg. 16-56, 1868-1908) 
(2)   Statistik der Krankheitsfälle der activen Knappschaftsmitglieder im Preussischen Staate  
        (erschienen in: Zeitschrift für das Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen im Preussischen Staate, Ministerium für öffentliche Arbeiten,  
        Jg. 16-36, 1868-1888) 
(3)  Fischer, Wolfram (Hrsg.), Statistik der Bergbauproduktion Deutschlands 1850-1914, Quellen und Forschungen zur historischen Statistik von Deutschland VIII,  
        St. Katharinen, 1989 
              
         
Variable  Beobachtungszeitraum  Quelle 
         
Anzahl der  
-  Bergwerke  und Aufbereitungsanstalten (Steinkohlen, Braunkohlen, Eisenerz, sonstige Erze, Steinsalz, 
Steinbrüche), 
-  Hüttenwerke und zugehörigen Werkstätten (Eisen und Stahl, Zink, Blei/ Kupfer/Silber, Alaun/Vitriol, Teer/ 
Paraffin), 
-  Salinen  
je Knappschaftsverein und Oberbergamtsbezirk
i
 
 
 
 
1867-1907 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Tabelle I. B. 
     
Art der Krankheitsfälle, 
-  Gelenkrheumatismus, 
-  Parasiten, 
-  Quetschungen und Contusionen, 
-  Rheumatismus, 
-  Wunden, 
-  Wurmkrankheit, 
je Knappschaftsverein 
 
 
 
1867-1887 
 
 
 
(2) 
     
Ausgaben für Arzthonorare je Knappschaftsverein
ii 1867-1907    (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Ausgaben für Krankenlöhne je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Ausgaben für Medizin je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Ausgaben der Krankenkasse für Arzthonorare (einige Knappschaftsvereine in den OBABs Bonn, Clausthal und Halle)  1867-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Ausgaben der Krankenkassen für Krankenlöhne (einige Knappschaftsvereine in den OBABs Bonn, Clausthal und Halle)  1867-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
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Variable  Beobachtungszeitraum  Quelle 
         
Ausgaben der Krankenkassen für Medizin (einige Knappschaftsvereine in den OBABs Bonn, Clausthal und Halle)  1867-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Bezahlte Krankheitstage der ständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1888  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Bezahlte Krankheitstage der unständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1888  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Bezahlte Krankheitstage je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Durchschnittliche Krankheitstage pro Krankheitsfall bei ständigen Mitgliedern je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1888  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Durchschnittliche Krankheitstage pro Krankheitsfall bei unständigen Mitgliedern je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1888  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Durchschnittliche Krankheitstage pro Krankheitsfall je Knappschaftsverein    1867-1888  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Förderung von Braunkohle 
-  Deutsches Zollgebiet und Königreich Preußen 
-  OBAB Bonn, Breslau, Clausthal, Dortmund und Halle 
 
1850-1914 
1861-1914 
 
      (3) Tab. 60-61 
 (3) Tab. 112-116 
     
Förderung von Steinkohle 
-  Deutsches Zollgebiet und Königreich Preußen 
-  OBAB Bonn, Breslau, Clausthal und Dortmund und Halle 
 
1850-1914 
1861-1914 
 
     (3) Tab. 1-2 
(3) Tab. 43 bis 47 
     
Gesamtausgaben der Krankenkassen (einige Knappschaftsvereine in den OBABs Bonn, Clausthal und Halle)  1867-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Gesamteinnahmen der Krankenkassen (einige Knappschaftsvereine in den OBABs Bonn, Clausthal und Halle)  1867-1907  (1) Tab. V. C. 
     
Gesundheitsausgaben je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Kranke ständige Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 01. Januar des Jahres  1867-1888  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Kranke ständige Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 31. Dezember des Jahres  1867-1888  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Kranke unständige Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 01. Januar des Jahres  1867-1888  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Kranke unständige Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 31. Dezember des Jahres  1867-1888  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Krankenabgänge durch Tod je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Krankenabgänge durch Genesung je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Krankenabgänge wegen anderer Ursachen je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
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Variable  Beobachtungszeitraum  Quelle 
         
Ständige Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein und Altersklasse am 31. Dezember des Jahres 
-  unter 16 Jahren, 
-  zwischen 16 bis 25 Jahren, 
-  zwischen 26 bis 35 Jahren, 
-  zwischen 36 bis 45 Jahren, 
-  zwischen 46 bis 55 Jahren, 
-  über 56 Jahren, 
    bzw. 
-  unter 16 Jahren, 
-  zwischen 16 bis 20 Jahren, 
-  21- bis 25-Jährige, 
-  26- bis 30-Jährige, 
-  31- bis 35-Jährige, 
-  36- bis 40-Jährige, 
-  41- bis 45-Jährige, 
-  46- bis 50-Jährige, 
-  51- bis 55-Jährige, 
-  über 56 Jahre, 
 
 
 
1867-1888 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1889-1907 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Tab. II. 
     
Summe aller Arbeitsunfälle je Knappschaftsverein (im Lazarett und zuhause behandelt)  1867-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Summe aller sonstigen Krankheitsfälle je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Summe aller kranken Mitglieder (ständige und unständige) je Knappschaftsverein am 01. Januar des Jahres  1867-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Summe aller kranken Mitglieder (ständige und unständige) je Knappschaftsverein am 31. Dezember des Jahres  1867-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Summe aller Krankheitsfälle je Knappschaftsverein auf Grund Quetschungen und Wunden  1867-1887  (2) 
     
Summe aller Krankheitsfälle je Knappschaftsverein auf Grund von Rheumatismus  1867-1887  (2) 
     
Summe aller Krankheitsfälle je Knappschaftsverein auf Grund von Parasiten und der Wurmkrankheit  1867-1887  (2) 
     
Summe der Mitgliedsbeiträge der Ständigen zur Krankenkasse je Knappschaftsverein (einige Knappschaftsvereine in 
den OBABs Bonn, Clausthal und Halle) 
1867-1888  Tab. V. C 
     
Summe der Mitgliedsbeiträge der Unständigen zur Krankenkasse je Knappschaftsverein (einige Knappschaftsvereine 
in den OBABs Bonn, Clausthal und Halle) 
1867-1888  Tab. V. C 
     
Summe aller Beiträge der Werkseigentümer zur Krankenkasse je Knappschaftsverein (einige Knappschaftsvereine in 
den OBAB Bonn, Clausthal und Halle) 
1867-1907  Tab. V. C 
     
Summe aller Mitgliedsbeiträge zur Krankenkasse je Knappschaftsverein (einige Knappschaftsvereine in den 
OBABsBonn, Clausthal und Halle) 
1867-1907  Tab. V. C 
     51 
 
Summe der Mitgliedsbeiträge der Ständigen je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1888  Tab. V. C. 
 
         
Variable  Beobachtungszeitraum  Quelle 
         
Summe der Mitgliedsbeiträge der Unständigen je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  Tab. V. C. 
     
Summe aller Mitgliedsbeiträge je Knappschaftsvereins  1867-1907  Tab. V. C. 
     
Summe aller Beiträge der Werkseigentümer je Knappschaftsverein  1867-1907  Tab. V. C. 
     
Summe der ständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 01. Januar des Jahres  1867-1907  Tab. II. 
     
Summe der ständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 31. Dezember des Jahres  1867-1907  Tab. II. 
     
Summe der unständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 01. Januar des Jahres  1867-1907  Tab. II. 
     
Summe der unständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 31. Dezember des Jahres  1867-1907  Tab. II. 
     
Zahl der Arbeitsunfälle je Knappschaftsverein, im Lazarett behandelt  1867-1907  Tab. IV. 
     
Zahl der Arbeitsunfälle je Knappschaftsverein, zuhause behandelt  1867-1907  Tab. IV. 
     
Zahl der sonstigen Krankheitsfälle je Knappschaftsverein, im Lazarett behandelt  1867-1907  Tab. IV. 
     
Zahl der sonstigen Krankheitsfälle je Knappschaftsverein, zuhause behandelt  1867-1907  Tab. IV. 
 
 
                                                           
i Oberbergamtsbezirke (OBABs) im Königreich Preußen: Bonn, Breslau, Clausthal, Dortmund, Halle. 
ii Sämtliche Geldgrößen werden in der preußischen Knappschaftsstatistik bis 1874 einschließlich in preußischen Talern (14-Taler-Fuß) und Silbergroschen angegeben, ab 
1875 in Mark und Pfennig. Die Umrechnung von Talern (Silbergroschen) in Mark (Pfennige) erfolgt zu 1 Taler gleich 3 Mark (30 Silbergroschen gleich 100 Pfennige); 
Quelle: Sprenger, Bernd, Das Geld der Deutschen – Geldgeschichte Deutschlands von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Paderborn et al., 1991, S. 187. 
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Appendix A, continued  
         
A. Bayern 
(1)   Statistik der Knappschaftsvereine im bayerischen Staate   (Königlich Bayerisches Oberbergamt, Jg. 14-37, 1884-1907) 
(2)   Fischer, Wolfram (Hrsg.), Statistik der Bergbauproduktion Deutschlands 1850-1914, Quellen und Forschungen zur historischen Statistik von Deutschland VIII,  
        St. Katharinen, 1989 
              
         
Variable  Beobachtungszeitraum  Quelle 
         
Anzahl der  
-  Bergwerke und Aufbereitungsanstalten (Steinkohlen, Braunkohlen, Eisenerz, sonstige Erze, Steinsalz, 
Steinbrüche), 
-  Hüttenwerke und zugehörigen Werkstätten (Eisen und Stahl, Zink, Blei/ Kupfer/Silber, Alaun/Vitriol, Teer/ 
Paraffin), 
-  Salinen  
je Knappschaftsverein und Berginspektionsbezirk, Bayern 1884-1907
ii 
 
 
 
1884-1907 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Tabelle I. B. 
     
Ausgaben für Arzthonorare je Knappschaftsverein
ii  1884-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Ausgaben für Krankenlöhne je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Ausgaben für Medizin je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Bezahlte Krankheitstage je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Durchschnittliche Krankheitstage pro Krankheitsfall je Knappschaftsverein    1884-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Förderung von Braunkohle im Königreich Bayern  1860-1914  (2) Tab. 112-119 
     
Förderung von Steinkohle im Königreich Bayern  1850-1914  (2) 48 und 50 
     
Gesamtausgaben der Krankenkassen  1901-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Gesamteinnahmen der Krankenkassen   1901-1907  (1) Tab. V. C. 
     
Gesundheitsausgaben je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1907  (1) Tab. V. D. 
     
Krankenabgänge durch Tod je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Krankenabgänge durch Genesung je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Krankenabgänge wegen anderer Ursachen je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 53 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
         
Variable  Beobachtungszeitraum  Quelle 
     
Ständige Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein und Altersklasse am 31. Dezember des Jahres 
-  unter 26 Jahren 
-  26- bis 35-Jährige 
-  36- bis 45-Jährige 
-  46- bis 55-Jährige 
-  56- bis 65-Jährige 
 
 
1884-1907 
 
 
(1) Tab. II. 
     
Summe aller Krankheitsfälle je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Summe aller Krankheitsfälle je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Summe aller kranken Mitglieder (ständige und unständige) je Knappschaftsverein am 01. Januar des Jahres  1884-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Summe aller kranken Mitglieder (ständige und unständige) je Knappschaftsverein am 31. Dezember des Jahres  1884-1907  (1) Tab. IV. 
     
Summe aller Beiträge der Werkseigentümer zur Krankenkasse je Knappschaftsverein  1901-1907  (1) Tab. V. 
     
Summe aller Mitgliedsbeiträge zur Krankenkasse je Knappschaftsverein  1901-1907  (1) Tab. V. 
     
Summe aller Mitgliedsbeiträge je Knappschaftsverein  1884-1888  (1) Tab. V. 
     
Summe der ständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 01. Januar des Jahres  1884-1907  (1) Tab. II. 
     
Summe der ständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 31. Dezember des Jahres  1884-1907  (1) Tab. II. 
     
Summe der unständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 01. Januar des Jahres  1884-1907  (1) Tab. II. 
     
Summe der unständigen Mitglieder je Knappschaftsverein am 31. Dezember des Jahres  1884-1907  (1) Tab. II. 
 
 